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Abstract
We study a memory-based Boolean game (MBBG) taking place on the regular ring, wherein each agent
acts according to its local optimal states of the last M time steps recorded in memory, and the agents in
the minority are rewarded. One free parameter p among 0 and 1 is introduced to denote the strength of the
agents’ willing to make a decision according to its memory. We find that, given proper willing strength p,
the MBBG system can spontaneously evolve to a state of better performance than the random game; while
for larger p, the herd behavior emerges which reduces the system profit. By analyzing the dependence of the
system’s dynamics on the memory capacity M , we find that a higher memory capacity favors the emergence
of the better performance state, and effectively restrains the herd behavior, therefore increases the system
profit. Considering the high cost of long-time memory, the enhancement of memory capacity for restraining
the herd behavior is also discussed, and the M = 5 is suggested to be one good choice.
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Dynamical systems with many elements under mutual regulation or influence, such as the sys-
tems naturally arise in biology [1] and in the social sciences [2], underlie much of the phenomena
associated with complexity. The perspective of complex adaptive systems (CAS) composed of
agents under mutual influence have been proposed for understanding the rich and complex dy-
namics of these real-life systems [1, 3, 4, 5].
One of the simplest examples of a complex dynamical system is the minority game [6] (MG)
introduced by Challet and Zhang as a simplification of Arthur’s El Farol Bar attendance problem
[7]. Agents in the MG are designed to make choice (1 or 0, i.e. to attend a bar or refrain) based
on the aggregate signal (the global information in memory), i.e., which value was in the majority
for the last several time steps. The agents in the minority are rewarded, and those in the majority
punished since resources are limited. The MG model can serve as a general paradigm for resource
allocation and load balancing in multiagent systems and was study extensively [8, 9, 10, 11].
In contrast to this mean-field description of the MG, the Boolean game (BG) on the network of
interconnections between the agents was introduced in Ref. [12] considering that the agent can
also respond to the detailed information it receives from other specified agents. It was established
that coordination still arises out of local interactions in the BG, and the system as a whole achieves
“better than random” performance in terms of the utilization of resources [13, 14, 15, 16]. This
contributes to the solution of one basic question in studies of complexity, that is, how large systems
with only local information available to the agents may become complex through a self-organized
dynamical process [12].
Many real-life systems often seem a black box to us: the outcome may be observed, but the
underlying mechanism is not visible. Herd behavior, which describes the condition that many
agents display the same action, is one of the outcomes always present in ecosystems while the
corresponding mechanisms are unaware. The herd behavior has been extensively studied in Be-
havioral Finance and is found to be one factor of the origins of complexity that may enhance the
fluctuation and reduce the system profit [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. Also, the underlying mechanism of
the herd behavior is an interesting issue which has attracted economists’ and physicists’ interests.
Considering that herd behavior still occur although the agents prefer to be in the minority in some
real-life cases, one should seek the mechanism of the herd behavior from some other aspects rather
than the agents’ willing to be in majority [15].
In the previous studies of the BG, each agent acts according to the Boolean function, i.e., gets
its input from some other agents, and maps the input to a state it will adopt in the subsequent
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round [13, 14]. Inspired by the MG, we argue that the agents should make decisions based on the
knowledge of the past records, and the historical memory of individuals plays a key role in the
evolutionary games. In the present work, we study a memory-based Boolean game (MBBG) in
which each agent modifies its state based on its past experiences gained from the local interaction
with neighbors, and the agents in the minority of the whole system are rewarded.
The global information is not available, and the agents also do not know who are winners
in the previous rounds. They can only make use of the local information and gain experiences
from local interaction. It is worthwhile to emphasize that the agent’s ignorance of who are global
winners is one of the main differences from the previous studies on MG. Due to the lack of the
global information, each agent in our model attempts to be in the minority in its own small region
which consists of its immediate neighbors and itself, considering that there should exist positive
correlation between being the minority in the whole system and in its own local region. We call
this “local optimal assumption” (LOA) of the agent system. Then, our model can be depicted
as: in the lack of the global information and in the belief of the LOA, the agent pins its hope for
winning in the whole system on the effort to act as minority in its own region based on the local
experiences stored in memory.
Let us introduce the rules of the evolutionary MBBG. To simplify, each agent is confined to
a site of a regular network which is a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions
and coordination number z = 3 [23]. A local region for each agent thus contain 7 agents. When a
round of game is over, each agent will have the state information (+1 or−1) of its neighbors. Then
the agents are designed to know its local optimal state (LOS) in the past round by means of self-
questioning, i.e., each agent adopts its anti-state to play a virtual game with all its neighbors, and
calculates the virtual result. Comparing the virtual result with the actual one, each agent gets its
LOS which may turn it into minority of its own local region. In condition that the counterbalance
of the groups with +1 and −1 appears in one agent’s neighbors, its optimal state is randomly set
either as +1 or −1, because whichever state the agent chooses, it will break the counterbalance
and compel its own side into majority. Then, the agent records the LOS into memory. Taking into
account the bounded capacity of the agents, we assume that the agents are quite limited in their
power and can only retain the last M LOS in memory. We would like to reiterate that the so called
“local optimal state” does not mean the agent will be rewarded if has adopted it. Only the agents
in the global minority are rewarded by 1, and therefore the system profit equals to the number of
agents in the global minority. This is a main difference of our model from the Local Minority
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FIG. 1: The variance of the number of agents choosing +1 as a function of willing strength p with several
different memory capacities on the regular ring of size 2001. The solid line represents the system profit
of the random choice game which corresponds to the M = 0 case. The system performs better than the
random game when p is less than the intersection point pMinter.
Game [24].
There might be variability of the agents’ belief of the LOA and the willing to make decision
based on records in memory. We define the willing strength p to add this effect into our model.
That in detail is, at each time step, each agent acts based on its memory at probability p, or acts all
by himself at probability 1− p. In the former case, the probability of making a decision (choosing
+1 or −1) for each agent depends on the ratio of the numbers of +1 and −1 stored in its memory,
i.e., the agent chooses +1 with the probability P (+) = n+/(n+ + n−) = n+/M and −1 with the
probability P (−) = 1 − P (+), where n+ and n− are the numbers of +1 and −1, respectively.
In the latter case, the agent simply inherits its action in the last time step or chooses the opposite
action at a small probabilitym, named the mutation probability. Following the previous work [15],
we set it to be 0.01. The introduction of m adds several impulsive and unstable ingredients to our
model in view of the presence of the irrational effect .
Simulations are carried out for a population of N = 2001 agents located on network sites. The
time length T = 104 are fixed. In the initial state, +1 and −1 are uniformly distributed among all
the agents, and the memory information of each agent is randomly assigned. We have checked that
this assignment has no contributions to the evolutionary behavior of the system. All the simulation
results presented in this paper are average of 50 randomly assigned initial states.
The variance of systems σ2 = (1/T )
∑T
t=1(At − N/2)
2 [15, 16] which is the cumulative
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standard deviation from the optimal resource utilization over time length T , can be considered as a
global measure of the system’s optimality. The smaller σ2 corresponds to better optimality of the
system and the more system profit. Here, At denotes the number of agents choosing +1 at time
t. The simulation results σ2 as a function of p with different memory capacity M are presented in
Fig. 1. The result of the random game which is same as the MBBG with M = 0 is also plotted for
comparison. In the random choice game, At does not depend on the previous states of the system,
and its expectation is always 〈At〉 = N/2. The distribution of At has a Gaussian profile with
the variance to the expectation N/2 as σ2 = 0.25N in the limit of large N . For the MBBG with
M 6= 0, it is noticeable that these systems can perform better than that with random choice game
when p is in a certain interval (see Fig. 1 the interval where σ2 < 0.25N). This is an evidence of
the existence of a self-organized process in the systems. At larger p, the herd behaviors occur and
the subsequent oscillations cause the greater variances σ2 than that of the random choice game.
The intersection points of the curves of the MBBG and that of the random game (at p = pMinter,
M = 1, 2, ..., 20) denote the same system performance of them.
Let us firstly consider the extreme case p = 0 which means that the agents act all by themselves
without considering the historical memory. In this case, each agent merely changes its action with
the mutation probability m, and there is no preferential choice for +1 and −1 so that no herd
behaviors occur. Following Ref. [15], the expectation of At+1 is,
〈At+1〉 = At(1−m) +m(N −At) = At +m(N − 2At). (1)
Assuming At > N/2, for 0 < m < 1/2, we have At > At+1 > N/2. Thus, if large event has
taken place initially in the system (e.g., At=0 ≫ N/2, or At=0 ≪ N/2), the effort of m will make
At slowly revert to the equilibrium position N/2. It is easy to prove that even when the mutation
probability m is very small, the system profit will be equal to random choice game on condition
that the evolutionary time T is sufficiently long. The simulation results for p = 0 (see Fig. 1) are
in well agreement with the our analysis.
The other extreme case is p = 1 where the herd behavior prevails. Comparing this case to
the p = 0 case, we can say that the occurrence of the herd behavior is intimately related to the
mechanism of the memory-based actions. In this case, if the agents choosing +1 and −1 are
equally mixed up in the networks, then the number of agents who record +1 as the LOS by self-
questioning (denoted by Sopt+1,t) has the expectation
〈Sopt+1,t〉
.
= N − At. (2)
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Thus, all over the system the collection of the agents’ newly recorded LOS is close to the anti-state
of the present system. For the system with small memory capacity M , e.g. M = 1, the agents’
new states for the subsequent round t + 1 gained from the records in memory are actually their
optimal states of the latest round, and thus the expectation of At+1 is
〈At+1〉 = 〈S
opt
+1,t〉
.
= N − At, (3)
with departure |〈At+1〉 − N/2|
.
= |At − N/2|. One can see that the departure from N/2 does
not reduce in average, while the state of the winning side reverses. Therefore, the prevalence of
the herd behavior which is denoted by the large durative oscillation will occur when p = 1 and
M = 1. On the other hand, for the system with larger values of the memory capacity M , the
agents have also stored more previous information in memory besides the latest LOS. Based on
more information their state updates will not be so intense and irrational as that with M = 1. As
a result, the behavior of the systems are mended by the rationality of their agents. It is clear in
Fig. 1 that the oscillation of the system with larger M is less acute than that with smaller M in the
p = 1 case. Furthermore, in the cases of p ∈ (pMinter, 1), it can also be found that the high memory
capacity of the agent can effectively restrain the herd behavior and thus increase the system profit.
The existence of the self-organization demonstrated in Fig. 1 can be understood by the dynam-
ics of the system in the mentioned two extreme cases: The action of the agent based on memory
with probability p will induce oscillation, while the independent mechanism with probability 1−p
will lead to a long reversion process to the equilibrium position N/2. Thus at a proper value of
p, the system can quickly arrive at the equilibrium position after the occurrence of a large event,
which leads to more system profit than the random game. Also, we can see that the underlying
mechanism of the herd behavior is related to the strength of the agents’ willing of making decision
based on the historical memory.
In the following, we discuss the effect of the memory capacity M to the behavior of the system
in detail from two points, the intersection pMinter and the corresponding transition rate, which will
be defined in the following.
We have known that, the MBBG system can perform either better or worse than the random
game when the value of p is smaller or larger than pMinter. The case of the better performance is due
to the emergence of the agents’ self-organization, and the case of the worse performance is due to
the prevalence of the herd behavior. The relation between pMinter and the memory capacity M are
plotted in Fig. 2. It is revealed that, the region (0, pMinter)where system performs better than random
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FIG. 2: The intersection point pMinter of the random game and the MBBG with different memory capacity
M , for regular ring with N = 2001. The inset is the log-log plot of the increments of pMinter as a function
of memory capacity M .
game broadens with the memory capacity M . That is to say, the system with larger memory
capacity has more probability of self-organizing to the better-performance case. In addition, the
inset in Fig. 2 presents the increments of the intersection point ∆pMinter when M increases by one
(i.e. ∆pMinter = pM+1inter − pMinter) as a function of M . This measure corresponds to the “marginal
return” in economics. We can see that, when the memory capacity is large, the increment is small.
The scaling behavior at large M implies that pMinter is arriving at a level number close to 1. It is
remarkable that the behavior of the ∆pMinter withM is not monotonic. There exists the special point
at M = 4 which implies that the pMinter with M = 5 is larger comparing to the value estimated
from the trend exhibited from all the other values of M .
Inspired by the fact that in many situations the agents have to operate in dynamic (and in
general, stochastic) environments, we can imagine that, due to some external impacts the willing
strength p of the agents in our model may be not fixed, but vary with time. In the case that
p fluctuates around pMinter, there exists the transition from the case of the better performance to
the case where the herd behavior seriously impacts the system profit. Let us now focus on the
rate of the transition between the two cases when p is fluctuating. For convenience, we call this
rate the “transition rate” which is different from its traditional meaning in the study of the phase
transition. It is noticeable in Fig 1 that, at the intersection point pMinter, different memory lengthes
M correspond to different values of slope. We study the relation between the slope at pMinter (i.e.
the transition rate) and the memory capacity M (see Fig. 3). It can easily be found that, the shorter
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FIG. 3: The memory capacity M and the slope of the variance at the intersection point pMinter. The inset is
the corresponding log-log plot, where the crossover at M = 5 is obvious.
the memory is, the rapider the transition from the two cases would be. One can also consider the
transition rate as a measure of the system’s risk of suffering from the herd behavior. The results in
Fig. 3 thus is the dependence between the system’s risk and the memory capacity M . It is clear
that, those systems with higher memory capacity can constrain the occurrence of the herd behavior
more efficiently.
On the other hand, if the question facing us is to bring down the system’s risk or to design a
system with low risk of suffering from the herd behavior, enhancing the agents’ memory capacity
is indeed an effective way. However, the enhancement of the memory capacity in real-life cases
would cost much. In this context, it is necessary to discuss how large memory capacity would
be proper. Interestingly, we find that the dependence of the slope on M approximately obeys
scaling laws with two exponents (the inset in Fig. 3). That is, for small M (M ≤ 5) the scaling
exponent is about −1.813, after which, at larger M , there is a crossover to −0.893. This behavior
implies that, when the memory length M is already 5 or larger, if increase M , the risk reduces
slower than the small M cases. Also it is obvious that the value of the transition rate at M = 5
is already small. When M > 5 the effort to increase memory capacity which costs much can not
gain good mark in reducing system crisis. Further simulation results show that the two-exponent
scaling behavior divided by M = 5 holds for different system size N , coordination number z and
mutation probability m. Moreover, in the previous intersection analysis we have proved that the
pMinter at M = 5 is comparatively large. Thus we argue that, M = 5 may be a good choice to
improve the performance of the system.
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In summary, inspired by the minority game, we studied a memory-based Boolean Game on
regular ring. The simulation results with various memory capacity M are discussed. We found
that, those systems with nonzero M can perform better than that of the random choice game
when willing strength p is in a certain interval. This is reasonable evidence of the existence of
a self-organized process taking place within the agent system, although only local information
is available to the agents. The memory capacity M are found to have remarkable effect on the
agent system. That is, the larger the M is, the more probably the self-organized process would
emerge since the value of pMinter increases. Moreover, larger memory capacity corresponds to
smaller degree of the herd behavior at large p, and less risk of the system suffering from the herd
behavior when p fluctuates around pMinter. In addition, we propose the question of designing the
system which is robust to the impact of the herd behavior, and the choice of M is also discussed
considering the high cost of enhancing M in real-life cases.
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